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POST-CONFLICT RULE OF LAW BUILDING: THE NEED FOR
A MULTI-LAYERED, SYNERGISTIC APPROACH
JANE STROMSETH*

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, considerable blood, sweat, and treasure have
been devoted to building the rule of law in the wake of armed
conflicts and military interventions in many parts of the world.
From Afghanistan to Iraq, Kosovo to East Timor, and Sierra Leone
to Haiti and elsewhere, international interveners and local leaders
have struggled to address both security and humanitarian challenges in societies seeking to overcome a legacy of violent conflict.
Increasingly, international and domestic reformers have come to
appreciate that long-term solutions to security and humanitarian
problems depend crucially on building and strengthening the rule
of law: fostering effective, inclusive, and transparent indigenous
governance structures; creating fair and independent judicial
systems and responsible security forces; reforming and updating
legal codes; and creating a widely shared public commitment to
human rights and to using the new or reformed civic structures
rather than relying on violence or self-help to resolve problems.'
Building the rule of law is no simple matter, although triumphal
interventionist rhetoric occasionally implies that it is. The idea of
the rule of law is often used as a handy shorthand way to describe
the extremely complex bundle of cultural commitments and
institutional structures that support peace, human rights, democracy, and prosperity. On the institutional level, the rule of law
* Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Institute, Georgetown University Law
Center. Portions of this Article were previously published in JANE STROMSETH, DAVID
WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (2006).
1. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 3 (2006).
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involves courts, legislatures, statutes, executive agencies, elections,
a strong educational system, a free press, and independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as bar associations, civic
associations, political parties, and the like. On the cultural level, the
rule of law requires human beings who are willing to give their
labor and their loyalty to these institutions, eschewing self-help
solutions and violence in favor of democratic and civil participation.2
Especially in societies in which state institutions and the law itself
have been deeply discredited by repressive or ineffectual governments, persuading people to buy into rule of law ideals is difficult.3
Building public trust in newly developing legal institutions can take
years, and mutually reinforcing reforms may be needed in multiple
areas-from constitutional and justice system reform to initiatives
designed to strengthen access to justice and increase public
confidence in the very idea of the rule of law. Both institutionally
and culturally, building the rule of law also requires extensive
human and financial resources, careful policy coordination between
numerous international actors and national players, and at the
same time an ability to respond quickly, creatively, and sensitively
to unpredictable developments on the ground.4
For the last few years, my colleagues David Wippman, Rosa
Brooks, and I conducted research in many societies-including
Sierra Leone, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and elsewhere
-with the aim of understanding the many challenges of strengthening the rule of law in the aftermath of conflict. We interviewed
national officials and civil society leaders, UN officials and staff,
rule of law experts from different governments, and practitioners
from many different NGOs and organizations, and we looked
carefully at the unique circumstances and challenges in particular
diverse, post-conflict societies.
Our resulting book, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule
of Law After Military Interventions, is designed to pull together in
one volume the disparate bits of knowledge gained in the past
decade with the goal of understanding why past international
efforts to strengthen the rule of law after conflict have so often
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
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fallen short, and to offer concrete suggestions for what might be
done better in the future.5 We deliberately aimed to write a practical
book that would assist policymakers and field workers, offer enough
theoretical, legal, and historical background to enable readers to
contextualize and understand the basic dilemmas inherent in
interventions designed to build the rule of law, and help to evaluate
unique as well as recurring challenges in different post-conflict
societies. 6 Our aim throughout was to examine the rule of law
holistically, to make the whole elephant visible-not just the trunk
or the tail-and to explore how the pieces fit together: from
blueprints and constitutional frameworks for post-conflict governance, to security and justice system reform, to accountability for
human rights atrocities, to initiatives aimed at building public and
cultural support for the rule of law.
Recent experience holds both good news and bad. The bad news
is that the track record of interveners in building the rule of law
after conflict has not been very impressive.' This is in part because
post-conflict societies-with legacies of insecurity, discredited
political institutions, damaged infrastructure, limited resources,
and public distrust-are usually not ideal environments for
promoting the rule of law.8
But to some degree, the poor track record of rule of law promotion
efforts is due to the failure of interveners to appreciate the complexities of the project of creating the rule of law. The good news is that
we are finally beginning to have a sense of "best practices," an
increasingly nuanced understanding of what works and what does
not in post-conflict settings.9 For instance:
We now have a clear sense of the critical importance of
immediately reestablishing basic security in the wake of
military interventions, which in turn requires that the
international community plan in advance for the rapid
deployment of civilian police in the post-conflict period. 10

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 10.
Id.
See id. at 9.
See id.
Id.

Id.
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" Similarly, we now understand that effectively reestablishing
security means far more than simply ensuring that looting
and violent crime are kept in check: it also involves ensuring
that basic daily needs are met and that people have adequate food, water, shelter, medical care, and so on.1 '
* After more than a decade of well-intentioned but flawed
interventions, we now understand the importance of addressing the various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in
a coordinatedway, rather than allowing security, economic
issues, civil society, and governmental issues all to be dealt
with by separate offices operating on more or less separate
tracks. 12
" Perhaps most importantly, we have learned from failures in
the past that there is no "one size fits all" template for
rebuilding the rule of law in post-conflict settings: to be
successful, programs to rebuild the rule of law must respect
and respond to the unique cultural characteristics and needs
of each post-intervention society." Moreover, the rule of law
cannot be imposed from on high; to enjoy legitimacy, it must
be built with the support and leadership of the local population.' 4
This Article will highlight some of the major themes and conclusions of our book. First, I will discuss our diagnosis of why past
efforts to strengthen the rule of law in the wake of conflict and
intervention have not been as effective as any of us would like.1 5
Second, I will sketch out the positive framework we offer: an
integrated, synergistic approach to building the rule of law that
keeps a clear focus on ultimate goals, is adaptive and seeks to build
upon solid cultural foundations, and is systemic in stressing the
need for mutually reinforcing reforms in multiple areas. 6 Third, I
will discuss some of the key obstacles that need to be tackled in

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 195.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
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order to achieve more effective results on the ground. 17 Above all, I
will stress the importance of a multi-layered approach to building
the rule of law-an approach that focuses not only on strengthening
institutions but also on building cultural and political support for
the rule of law. Indeed, without a widely shared commitment to the
idea of the rule of law, courts are just buildings, judges are just
bureaucrats, and constitutions are just pieces of paper."8
I. WHY HAVE PAST POST-CONFLICT RULE OF LAW EFFORTS
OFTEN FALLEN SHORT?

Too

Despite millions of dollars and considerable human effort and
sacrifice over recent years, initiatives to strengthen the rule of law
in many post-conflict societies have often been disappointing in
terms of their results and impact. 9 There are many reasons for this,
including reasons specific to particular post-conflict countries, such
as the extent to which domestic leaders are committed to rule of law
reforms and are viewed by the public as effective and legitimate.
But let me highlight three overarching reasons that have tended to
recur across different societies.
First is simply the inherent difficulty of the endeavor. In societies
that have been wracked by violent conflict, building the rule of law,
understood broadly, is incredibly hard. Particularly in post-conflict
societies where political institutions are discredited, legal institutions are distrusted to the extent they exist at all, and infrastructures are devastated, positive change generally will require
enormous commitments of time, energy, and resources. Spoilers
may contend for power and resources and local leaders may oppose
reforms. Overcoming public distrust and building institutions
worthy of confidence can take many years.2"
To complicate matters further, efforts of external interveners to
help build the rule of law are fraught with paradoxes and difficulties. Indeed, a paradox is inherent in the very project of trying to
17. See infra Part III.
18. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
19. See id. at 65-68 (discussing challenges in societies as diverse as Kosovo, Haiti, East
Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq). However, despite problems, rule of law programs have helped
people in many societies. See id. at 388.
20. See id. at 311.
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build the rule of law in the aftermath of a military intervention: a
core idea of the rule of law is that reason is better than force as a
means of resolving disputes, yet by definition, interventions resolve
problems through force.21 There is no way around this problem, but
interveners should at least acknowledge the paradox inherent in
trying to pull the rule of law from the barrel of a gun and recognize
the ways in which the very fact of the intervention itself may
undermine their claims about the value of the rule of law.2 2
The intervention's perceived legality and legitimacy, for example,
can have significant effects on subsequent efforts to build the rule
of law. Interventions increasingly involve a long-term process of
transformation; their legitimacy will constantly be reassessed by
relevant actors as circumstances evolve on the ground, but a strong
consensus about the intervention's legality and legitimacy at the
outset can increase the prospects for ongoing cooperation from both
local and international actors.2" Recent experience in Iraq and
elsewhere, for example, has shown that governments are far more
likely to participate in an intervention-and contribute to postconflict reconstruction-if they view the underlying intervention
itself as legitimate.2 4
An intervention's perceived legitimacy will also be influenced by
the concrete objectives interveners pursue once they are deployed on
the ground.2 5 Here again international legal norms are relevant.
Whatever factors trigger states to intervene in the first place, they
increasingly face international pressure to help build institutions
that advance self-determination and protect basic international
human rights, even as they also seek to respect the unique culture
of the people whose future is directly at stake.2 6 In short, if interveners want to be successful at a practical level in building the rule of
law domestically, they will need to take seriously international legal
norms that can have a significant impact on whether other
states-as well as the local population-view their intervention as
legitimate and worth supporting.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 312-14.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 18-19.
See id. at 19.
Id.
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Another set of challenges includes the difficult trade-offs that
accompany efforts to build the rule of law. Building the rule of law
is a holistic process, and it is almost inevitably marked by internal
contradictions.2 7 For example:
" Short-term interests may genuinely conflict with long-term
interests (for instance, collaboration with local warlords or
militias may be useful in establishing security in the short
term but may dangerously empower "spoilers" in the long
28
term).
" Fostering 'local ownership" and respecting local cultural
norms may conflict with efficiency interests or international
standards.2 9
" Satisfying minority political participation interests may
conflict with satisfying majorities, 0 and constitutional
blueprints designed to bring an end to armed conflict may
defer rather than resolve difficult tradeoffs. 1
" Promoting the rule of law is not politically neutral, although
interveners often like to imagine that it is. In practice, the
decisions interveners make necessarily empower some local
actors at the expense of others. This incites opposition
(sometimes violent), which can in turn force interveners to
respond with coercion, which then generates more opposition.32
Building the rule of law requires a constant balancing act. As a
result, movement toward the rule of law often is not linear, but back
and forth. Interveners must constantly make choices among
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 88-89 (citing Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposal Versus

Processes, in

THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY:

CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN,

CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY 1, 15-16 (A. Reynolds ed., 2002)). Blueprints emerge from a
process of political bargaining and compromise; what emerges is not an ideal, coherent design,
but a cobbled-together mix of sometimes conflicting and ambiguous provisions focused
principally on meeting the short-term interests of key international and local actors. The
better that interveners understand the risks of different blueprint options, the easier it will
be to avoid the pitfalls associated with each, and to resist seemingly attractive short-term
options that have disastrous long-term consequences. STROMSETH ETAL., supranote 1, at 132.
32. See id. at 12.
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problematic alternatives. But interveners, precisely because they
are interveners (and so do not fully understand local culture,
interests, or institutions), are often not well positioned to make such
choices and may not fully understand the likely consequences."
Although progress will rarely be linear, reformers nonetheless need
to strive to keep the momentum going in the direction of the rule of
law. 4 Once the balance tips too much in the other direction, it can
be exceptionally difficult to recover.3 5
This does not mean that building the rule of law is a fool's errand.
It does mean that it is far more difficult than is generally understood. The evidence suggests, however, that reformers can achieve
moderate success if they take these complexities into account and
plan accordingly. 6
A second reason why past rule of law efforts have fallen short is
the tendency of interveners to focus on formal institutions-the
means-with insufficient appreciation for the underlying complexities of building the rule of law. Especially important is the need to
focus on the perceptions of ordinary citizens and to strengthen
cultural commitments to the very idea of the rule of law.37
Theorists disagree about whether the rule of law is primarily
formal in nature (a matter of institutions and procedures), or
fundamentally substantive as well (a matter of rights and justice)."
In practice, when policymakers talk about the rule of law as a goal,
they usually have in mind a mix of formalistic and substantive
outcomes. That is, they are looking for an outcome in which new or
reformed legal and judicial institutions are created, respected, and
actually used by members of the society in a way that furthers core
international human rights norms.3
But rule of law programs usually focus almost exclusively on
institutions and legal codes as a means of achieving such an
outcome, assuming that a cultural commitment to the rule of law
and the values that underlie it will follow naturally from reformed
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 13.
See id. at 179.
See id. at 13.
See id. at 69.
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institutions and codes. This assumption is flawed. Although institutions and codes are an important part of the picture, for the rule
of law to exist, people must also believe in the value and efficacy of
legal institutions as a means of resolving disputes. A belief in the
value of the rule of law does
not follow inevitably from the creation
40
of formal legal structures.
Getting people to believe in the rule of law is very complex. 41 It
not only requires creating appropriate background conditions
(fostering perceptions that the intervention is legitimate, establishing security, creating viable governance blueprints, moving forward
on justice system reform, and so forth), but it also involves grappling with complex issues of how cultures change and creating rule
of law programs that foster cultural change. In order to build the
rule of law, interveners must understand how complex an edifice it
really is, as it includes both formal and substantive aspects.
We found that although many organizations and individuals have
an intuitive sense of what the rule of law entails, too often interveners pay insufficient attention to its complexities-especially to the
need for cultural commitments to the very idea of the rule of
law-and to whether reforms are accessible and responsive to a
country's people and their needs. 42 The importance of cultural
context is illustrated by a story, perhaps apocryphal, that we tell
early in the book and is worth recounting here.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some
Middle Eastern governments were anxious to improve the lot of
nomadic tribespeople, who roamed from place to place, living in
tents, and rarely having reliable access to clean water, health care,
or schools. The governments built new houses for the nomads in
various towns and gave them to the tribes for free, confidently
expecting that the nomads would immediately transform themselves into ordinary townspeople. The nomads promptly quartered
their camels in the fine shelters and then lived themselves in their
old tents outside the houses, to the government's great consternation. The houses soon deteriorated, as they were not designed with
the needs of camels in mind, and before long, most of the nomads
40. See id. at 310-11.
41. See id. at 311.
42. See id. at 56-57.
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returned to their wanderings. The nomads, it turned out, did not
particularly want to live in one place.4"
Well-intentioned efforts by interveners to build the rule of law in
post-conflict societies by creating formal structures and rewriting
constitutions can run into similar problems. 44 Rule of law reformers
may assume that "if you build it, they will come" applies to courts
as much as to baseball fields. But courts and constitutions do not
occupy the same place in every culture, and external efforts focusing
on formal institutional reform can often appear irrelevant to the
concerns and practices of ordinary people, social groups, tribes, and
other segments of the population in different post-conflict societies.4 5
Furthermore, law cannot-nor should it-be imposed from on
high by external interveners; we emphasize the need to understand
the unique culture, history, and political terrain in each country and
to work with local leaders to build upon existing cultural foundations. The intervener's understanding (or lack of understanding) of
the unique culture and aspirations of the local population will have
a profound impact."
We offer a pragmatic definition of the rule of law that seeks to
capture what most policymakers are aiming for in promoting the
rule of law:
The "rule of law" describes a state of affairs in which the state
successfully monopolizes the means of violence, and in which
most people, most of the time, choose to resolve disputes in a
manner consistent with procedurally fair, neutral, and universally applicable rules, and in a manner that respects fundamental human rights norms (such as prohibitions on racial, ethnic,
religious and gender discrimination, torture, slavery, prolonged
arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings). In the context
of today's globally interconnected world, this requires modern
and effective legal institutions and codes, and it also requires a
widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values
underlying these institutions and codes. 47

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 76-77.
See id. at 77.
Id.
See id. at 195.
Id. at 78.
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Our pragmatic definition highlights that the rule of law is a matter
of cultural acceptance as well as institutions and legal codes; it
focuses on both substantive aspects (protection of basic human
rights) as well as processes and institutions; and it recognizes that
much conflict resolution takes place in the "shadow of the law" and
depends on the public's confidence and belief in the very idea of
law.4 8
A third and related problem with many rule of law programs is
their segmentation. Different agencies and organizations understandably focus on their areas of specialization and expertise, such
as improving police, or courts, or prisons, or reforming legal codes.
But too often these efforts fail to pay adequate attention to how
different institutions and reforms relate to one another or to the
larger political system in which they are embedded.4 9 Also, rule of
law projects are often primarily determined by the practical
constraints of external interveners: their need to show measurable
outputs (number of courthouses built, computers installed, cops put
out on the beat, judges trained), with a hope that these steps will
add up to something we would recognize as the rule of law.5"
It is, of course, understandable that interveners (including
government agencies, NGOs, and so forth) focus on building needed
institutions-including courts, police, and prisons. The problem is
not an institutional focus per se, but rather an overly narrow and
insular concentration on institutions with insufficient attention to
the interrelations between them or to the larger cultural and
political context in which they function.
A narrow and segmented approach to institutions can lead to
piecemeal reforms of little enduring impact, 51 and to a continuing
deficit in public support.5 2 It also can reinforce a tendency for
predatory politics-that is, if institutions are built without careful
attention to the accountability of newly empowered actors and to
their role in the larger political system, interveners may simply

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 78-80.
id. at 179.
id.
id.
id.
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provide new tools for self-interested power holders to pursue their
own agendas rather than effectively building the rule of law. 3
The intervention in Haiti during the mid-1990s, for example, ran
up against many of these problems. Although enormous initial
progress was made in vetting and training the Haitian National
Police during the United Nations mission following Jean-Bertrand
Aristide's return to power, other parts of the justice system did not
receive the same degree of assistance or pressure for reform.54 As a
result, corrupt judges could be bribed to release suspects, and bad
governance generally undermined the larger political system in
which police operated.5 5 Large numbers of pre-trial detainees
languished for months or years in squalid prisons without legal
process.5 6 Little was done, moreover, to address the widespread
suspicion among ordinary people that law is a vehicle of control and
repression rather than of justice.5 7 And the initial police reforms
were ultimately undercut most profoundly by the failure to build a
more accountable political system in Haiti more generally.5" Similar
kinds of problems have occurred in other post-conflict societies as
well.

II. A POSITIVE, SYNERGISTIC APPROACH TO BUILDING THE
RULE OF LAW
Recognizing the enormous challenges of building the rule of law
in the wake of conflict and intervention, we offer a positive framework that acknowledges these complexities but seeks to move in a
positive direction.5 9
We begin by stressing that interveners need to be much more selfconscious about the inherent paradoxes and complexities of building
the rule of law after intervention. Interveners, as mentioned earlier,
need to acknowledge the paradox of trying to build the rule of law
from the barrel of a gun, and they need to recognize that the
53. See id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
See id. at 215.
Id. at 180.
See generally id. at 180, 214-18.
See id. at 388.
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perceived legitimacy of the intervention-and of their own conduct
on the ground-will profoundly influence the credibility of their
efforts to argue that law matters. Poorly thought-through rule of
law programs can be self-undermining and actually do damage to
the project of building the rule of law."°
We argue that interveners, like physicians, should therefore do
their best to first "do no harm."'" To avoid inadvertently undermining their own efforts, interveners should:
" Be transparent.When interveners seek to create consultative processes, but then ignore advice they don't like, it
undermines their credibility. Acknowledging that certain
policies and principles are nonnegotiable, at least in the
short term, may make interveners unpopular-but hardly
more unpopular than they are when they feign a willingness to allow local societies to make their own choices but
then veto those choices.62
" Be accountable.When interveners insist that legal codes in
a post-conflict society must reflect international human
rights standards, but interveners themselves seem unable or
unwilling to comply with those same standards, their
credibility inevitably suffers. Similarly, when anyone
affiliated with an intervening power behaves inappropriately
or commits crimes, interveners need to ensure that investigation, trial, and punishment are prompt, fair, and public.63
" Be better educated about the language and culture of the
local society.' Lack of cultural understanding can severely
undermine efforts to build the rule of law, whereas cultural
sensitivity can go a long way to building trust and confidence.6 5
" Plan carefully. It is easier to prevent damage than to undo
it, and poor planning often leads only to a need for embarrassing about-faces further down the road.66
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 390.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
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Act multilaterally and collaboratively.Given the paradoxes
inherent in trying to create the rule of law in the wake of
military interventions, interveners need to gain as much
legitimacy as possible. Ensuring that no one state or religion
or ethnicity is seen as behind all rule of law programs can
help diminish resentment and skepticism about the motives
of interveners.6 7
Next, we advocate a multi-layered approach to building the rule
of law that explicitly recognizes the need for multiple, mutually
reinforcing reforms that are carefully attuned to strengthening
cultural and political as well as institutional foundations for the
rule of law. We call this the synergisticapproach."5
The synergistic approach to building the rule of law is ends-based
and strategic.6" In other words, reformers need to be clear about the
ultimate rule of law goals they are striving to achieve rather than
70
focusing simply on building up institutions and formal structures.
Working toward fundamental goals such as establishing basic law
and order, a government bound by law, equality before the law, and
protection of basic human rights, among others, will require a
variety of cross-cutting programs and initiatives. 1 Reformers will
need to recognize that tensions may sometimes arise between some
of these goals and that it may not be possible to advance each goal
equally at the same pace, particularly in post-conflict settings with
limited resources and fragile stability. 2 But keeping such overarching goals firmly in mind-rather than assuming that they will
naturally emerge by building institutional structures-will help
interveners and local leaders focus on developing a range of
interrelated capabilities and the programs and initiatives that are
most likely to promote and sustain those capabilities.7 3

67. Id.
68. See id. at 80-84.
69. See id. at 81.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 81, 181-83. For a thoughtful defense of an ends-based approach to rule of law
building, see Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31, 34-37 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
73. STROMSETH ET AL., supranote 1, at 81.
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The synergistic approach to strengthening the rule of law is also
adaptive and dynamic. In this respect, it aims to build upon existing
cultural and institutional resources for the rule of law and to move
them in a constructive direction, but it also recognizes that the rule
of law is always a work in progress, requiring continual maintenance and reevaluation.7 4 This approach understands that the rule
of law cannot be imported wholesale; instead, it needs to be built
upon preexisting cultural commitments, enjoy popular legitimacy,
and address the needs of ordinary people in particular societies in
order to be sustainable."
We thus devote a major chapter76 to the difficult issue of building
rule of law cultures and stress that the rule of law is as much a
matter of creating new cultural commitments as a matter of
creating new legal institutions and codes.7 7 Yet we still do not know
much about how cultures change. As a result, fostering rule of law
cultures is exceptionally difficult, even assuming that all the
background conditions, such as security and institutions, are in
place. These background conditions in themselves are exceptionally
difficult to establish. It is particularly tough to foster a rule of law
culture in post-conflict settings where former leaders have discredited the law through past inefficacy or by prior use of law as an
instrument of repression.7"
Successfully building a rule of law culture requires interveners
and local leaders to think broadly and creatively, to understand the
needs and aspirations of the local population, and to work
innovatively on a wide range of programs.79 For example, when
considering ways to foster rule of law cultures, interveners should
examine the degree to which formal legal institutions such as courts
are utilized in a given society. In some societies, educated urbanites
may have made extensive use of formal legal institutions prior to an
intervention and be ready to use them again once stability is
restored, but these same institutions may have been virtually
irrelevant in rural areas or among less educated and less affluent
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 80.
See id. at 183.
Id. ch. 8.
Id. at 310.
See id. at 311.
See id. at 345.
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people. In such contexts, many people may be more accustomed to
turning to traditional or informal dispute settlement mechanisms.
These may range in complexity and legitimacy, but in some societies, such as East Timor, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms enjoy considerable local support.8 0 Reaching rural and less
affluent people may require finding creative ways to engage with
traditional and customary dispute settlement regimes 81while
working to alleviate discriminatory aspects of such systems.
We urge reformers who seek to build rule of law cultures to:
" Get to the grassroots.Reformers need to find ways to reach
beyond cities, state institutions, and political elites and to
build citizens' education, access to justice, and community
organizing and advocacy programs that will reach a larger
segment of the population. 2
* Strengthen civil society. Building and sustaining a rule of law
culture also requires a strong civil society. 83 An independent
and effective media, strong NGOs, and other civil institutions can be essential to effectively promoting the rule of
law. 4 Independent NGOs can play an important role in
helping to build a more transparent, effective, and fair
justice system and in keeping officials accountable.85 In
East Timor, for example, the Judicial System Monitoring
Programme (JSMP) has helped to strengthen the country's
developing justice institutions by monitoring and evaluating
problems and recommending reforms.8 6
• Focus on the next generation. In post-conflict societies with
little or no prior rule of law tradition, reformers may have to
overcome years of skepticism about law before the rule of law
can flourish.87 Educational programs and cultural exchange

80. Id. at 334-35.
81. See id. at 334-39.
82. See id. at 341.
83. Id. at 341.
84. See id. at 341-42.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 330-31. For information about the Judicial System Monitoring Programme,
see Judicial System Monitoring Programme, http://www.jsmp.minihub.org (last visited Feb.
16, 2008).
87. See STRoMSETH ETAL., supra note 1, at 342.
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initiatives can help educate and inspire young people about
the importance of human rights and the rule of law."8
" Give people a stake in the law. To sustain support for the rule
of law, reformers need to find ways to give large numbers of
people a stake in laws, legal institutions, and the institutions
of governance more broadly. This can be done both through
programs that seek to give ordinary people a sense of "ownership" over the law, 9 for instance by involving them in
contributing ideas for new institutions and codes, and by
linking rule of law programs to development and antipoverty initiatives.9 °
" Include marginalizedgroups. In addition to traditional rule
of law programs that focus mainly on the "supply side" of the
law-judges, lawyers, legislators, and so on-reformers also
need to focus on the "demand side" and on marginalized
groups,9 1 such as women, youth, and minorities, who will
otherwise remain vulnerable to abuse and possibly, in the
case of underemployed or unemployed youth, become
disaffected enough to pose a significant threat to stability.9 2
" Be creative. Since rule of law is a culture as much as a set of
institutions and legal codes, interveners need to be willing to
use the tools of "culture" as well as the tools of law and
development. 3 To capture the imagination and loyalty of
citizens in any society, reformers need to be willing to use
media, pop culture, and traditional narratives and methods
creatively to build support for rule of law reforms.9 4 In South
Africa, for example, reformers used such means successfully
to solicit ideas from the general public on the new constitution.95

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343.
See id.
See id. at 345.
See id. at 343-44.
Id. at 345.
See id.
See id. at 343.
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Finally, in addition to being adaptive and dynamic, the synergistic approach to building the rule of law is systemic.9 6 Appreciating
how institutions intersect and operate as a system is vital to
designing effective and balanced programs for reform.9" Although
the priorities in a particular society will depend on the areas of
greatest need, a systemic perspective can help to achieve more
enduring results not possible by focusing on single institutions in
isolation.9"
A systemic approach is especially crucial in working to strengthen
justice systems in post-conflict societies.99 Here it is important to
keep a clear eye both on the linkages between the different parts of
the justice system and on how they function within the larger
political system and culture."° If one component of the justice
system, such as police forces, is strengthened without adequate
attention to the others, such as courts and prisons, reforms may end
up being unsustainable. Likewise, if particular institutions are built
up without careful attention to the accountability of newly empowered actors or to their role in the political system, reforms may end
up being unsustainable or simply empowering unaccountable local
actors rather than genuinely building the rule of law.' ° '
In addition to addressing the now familiar "justice triad" of police,
courts, and prisons, we stress the importance of developing critical
capacitiesin the broad areas of law making, law enforcement, and
dispute adjudication, as well as a capacity for legal education.' °2
Thinking in these terms helps to underscore the principle that
building and sustaining an effective justice system requires an
interrelated web of supporting institutions, personnel, and capabili0 3
ties.1
To be sure, each post-conflict society presents unique circumstances, obstacles, and opportunities for justice system reform. Thus
a crucial starting point is a strategic assessment that takes account
of factors such as the distinctive "conflict legacy" in that society; the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

at 82.

at 183.
at 183-84.
at 184.
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particular needs; the available human, cultural, and material
resources; and the main obstacles and threats to reform. 10 4 At the
same time, countries recovering from conflict frequently face a
number of common challenges.
Law reform, for example, is usually a critical task in post-conflict
societies. 1 5 Existing law--or parts of it-may lack public legitimacy,
fail to address complex criminal activity, and fall short of international human rights standards.0 0 Criminal law and procedure often
require particularly urgent reforms. 107 All too often, however, new
laws are drafted by outsiders with limited local involvement. 10 8 We
emphasize the importance of strengthening local capacity for
lawmaking and compromise. Laws, after all, are a reflection of the
values and tradeoffs in a particular society, and strengthening the
processes of local lawmaking is just as important as substantively
reforming the law. 1 9
Regarding law enforcement capacity, we recognize the particularly daunting challenges of transforming police-society relations"0
and changing long-standing expectations and patterns of behavior,
especially in societies in which public distrust runs deep."' Changing the organizational culture of police is often critical to meaningful
reform."' A successful post-conflict police force will need fair and
transparent selection and promotion criteria, adequate pay, good
training, incentives for good performance, and mechanisms in place
for improving police-society relations." 3 Police reform often moves
104. See id. at 189.
105. See id. at 193-95.
106. See id. at 194-95.
107. See id. at 192.
108. See id. at 199 (discussing the lack of local involvement in post-conflict legal reform in
Kosovo and Afghanistan); see also David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of
Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 95, 117-19, 145 (2003).
109. See STROMSETH ET AL., supranote 1, at 199.
110. See id. at 204-05.
111. See id. at 203.
112. See id. at 205; see also DAVID H. BAYLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEMOCRATIZING THE
POLICE ABROAD: WHAT To Do AND How To Do IT 13-15 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffilesl/nij/188742.pdf.
113. STROMSETH ETAL., supranote 1, at 211-13; William G. O'Neill, Police Reform in PostConflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need To Know 9 (Intl Peace Acad. Policy
Paper, Apr. 2005), availableat http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/PolRefERpt.pdf. Police-society
relations can be improved through public outreach and complaint mechanisms. See id. at 7.
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more quickly than reforms in other parts of the justice system, as
was the case in Haiti. 114 But without corresponding reforms in
prisons and the judiciary, problems such as extended pretrial
detention, lack of due process, and unfairness in treatment of
suspects will persist." 5
In fact, prisons are usually shortchanged in post-conflict justice
reform."' Yet, as experience in Iraq and elsewhere has shown,
neglecting prisons can result in severe abuse and can have devastating long-term costs." 7 The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal in Iraq,
for instance, has greatly undermined U.S. efforts to promote the
rule of law in Iraq and elsewhere." ' Effective prison reform requires
clear rules that protect fundamental rights, good training, competent personnel, credible monitoring and accountability, adequate
resources, and often sustained international support." 9
In many post-conflict societies, building more impartial and
competent judiciaries has proven to be the most complex and
difficult aspect of justice system reform.'2 ° The specific challenges
and obstacles vary in different countries, but critical reforms
generally include: transparent and merit-based appointment
procedures; good training; building structural protections for
impartial decision making by increasing the transparency and
accountability of judicial operations; providing adequate resources
and budgets; supporting independent court monitoring organizations; investing in legal education; and, above all, addressing larger
systemic problems of external influence, political control, and
corruption that prevent impartial adjudication.' 2 '
Changing the attitudes and expectations of officials, police,
judges, and the public regarding how the justice system should
operate may be the hardest challenge of all, particularly in societies
in which police and courts previously served as tools of self-inter-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See STROMSETH ETAL., supra note 1, at 217.
See id. at 218.
See id.
See id. at 218-19.
See id. at 219.
See id. at 221-22, 226.
See id. at 247.
Id. at 247-48.
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ested leaders and other powerful actors rather than as instruments
of justice.'2 2
Even as each post-conflict society presents distinctive obstacles
and opportunities, some common problems and pitfalls have plagued
efforts to strengthen justice systems in a number of post-conflict
countries.' 2 3 These include:
" A failure to provide for applicable law that enjoys local
legitimacy 1 14 or to involve local decision makers sufficiently in law reform efforts; 2 5
" Unbalanced reform in the justice sector and premature
institution building without corresponding political
reforms;' 2 6
" Premature empowerment ofjudges or other justice system
officials without adequate training and before credible
disciplinary mechanisms are established.'2 7 In East Timor,
for instance, newly appointed national judges assumed the
bench without sufficient training. 2 ' They later failed
retention exams and were replaced by international judges
while they underwent extensive training;'2 9
" Failure to address sufficiently the needs of vulnerable
segments of the population, including women and girls,
who often face increased violence after conflicts; 30
" Neglecting rural areas and problems of access to justice
more generally;' 3 ' and
" Focusing on institutional building blocks and surface
indicators, such as numbers of courthouses established
and computers installed, without paying sufficient atten122. See id. at 246.
123. See id. at 248.
124. This was initially a problem in Kosovo. See id. at 195-96, 316-18.
125. See id. at 248.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 234; see alsoHansjdrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstructionof aJudicial
System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 55-56
(2001).
129. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 1, at 234-35; see also JUDICIAL SYS. MONITORING
PROGRAMME, OVERVIEW OFTHEJUSTICE SECTOR: MARCH 2005, at 7, 12,27-28 (2005), available
at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/reports.htm.
130. STROMSETH ET AL., supranote 1, at 248.
131. Id.
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tion to building the solid political foundations of a fair
justice system.' 32
At the same time, recent experience has also shown a number of
positive practices in post-conflict justice system reform. 133 These
include:
" Putting together an effective mix of international and local

jurists to help strengthen domestic justice systems after
34
conflict;
" Pursuing systemic reforms that address connections and
build synergies between key
justice institutions, such as
1 35
police, prisons, and courts;

" Promoting greater transparency in the justice system and
instituting
merit-based selection and promotion proce36
dures;

1

" Working to promote sustainable reforms by investing in
civil society organizations that can monitor legal institutions and advocate for reform, and by investing in legal
education; 37 and
" Working to develop inclusive and representative composition in justice institutions and38paying greater attention to
problems of access to justice. 1

None of this is easy. For example, developing an optimal combination of local and international jurists who can work together to
strengthen a domestic justice system after conflict is a difficult,
complex, highly context-specific endeavor. 139 On the one hand,
building local capacity, ownership, responsibility, and leadership is
fundamental. On the other hand, experienced international judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel from different countries can
provide an infusion of skills that can assist new domestic legal
personnel. International judges, for instance, can provide valuable
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 236-37.
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balance in highly charged, ethnically divided post-conflict
settings. 14°
International jurists can also help reinforce impartiality and
independence in the domestic judicial system.14 1 In Bosnia's Brcko
district, for example, local judges credit international jurists for
contributing to significant improvements and reforms in the justice
system. 4 2 International jurists have made an impact in Kosovo,
East Timor, Sierra Leone, and other countries as well.14 But finding
experienced judges who can deploy rapidly to post-conflict settings,
or who have relevant cultural knowledge and language ability, has
often not been easy, and ensuring a beneficial relationship between
144
national and international jurists requires considerable effort.
The experience to date highlights the need for more systematic
thinking up front
about designing effective arrangements and
145
partnerships.
The need for a systemic and synergistic approach to post-conflict
rule of law building is not limited to the justice system alone. The
requirement for more self-conscious connections and synergies
among different areas of reform exists more broadly. In many postconflict societies, for instance, groups and individuals who work on
justice system reform often have little contact with those who focus
on legal accountability for war crimes and human rights atrocities
through criminal tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions.'4 6 Yet, with thoughtful planning, these accountability
proceedings can be designed more effectively to help build and
strengthen domestic rule of law after conflict.
Sierra Leone's Special Court is one concrete example. A hybrid
war crimes tribunal designed to bring to justice those who bear the
greatest responsibility for the brutal atrocities that marked Sierra
Leone's violent civil war, the Special Court includes both international and national judges, prosecutors, defenders, investigators,
and administrative personnel. ' Though not without its challenges,
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 236.
See id.
See id. at 239.
See id. at 237-38.
See id. at 237.
See id. at 239.
See id.at 256-57.
See id. at 289-90.
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the Special Court has made positive contributions to strengthening
the rule of law in Sierra Leone through its demonstration effects
regarding the value and importance of fair justice, and through
concrete capacity-building effects.'48 These include the direct
training and experience gained by the Sierra Leonean investigators,
lawyers, and other personnel participating in the Special Court, and
social capacity building more broadly by creative outreach to Sierra
Leone's population. 1 49 The Special Court has reached out to the
public through community-based dialogues about the meaning and
significance of the Special Court's proceedings, through the
establishment of "Accountability Now" clubs at local universities
and schools, and through networking with local NGOs that focus on
the work of the court and on strengthening governmental accountability more generally. 5 °
The experience in Sierra Leone highlights that much more can be
accomplished if reformers think systematically and creatively from
the beginning about how accountability proceedings can contribute
to strengthening domestic rule of law.

III. CHALLENGES AHEAD IN PURSUING A MORE EFFECTIVE
APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW BUILDING

Even with a more nuanced understanding of the multi-layered
challenges of strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict societies,
many practical obstacles to actually implementing a more effective
approach on the ground still remain. Rule of law assistance is part
and parcel of the larger rebuilding effort in post-intervention
societies. 5 ' Just as the larger effort will not succeed unless rule of
law takes hold, so too will rule of law efforts fail if the larger effort
to restore peace and foster democratic governance does not
succeed.'5 2 In addition to specific and often daunting obstacles in
148. See id. at 295-98 (discussing demonstration and capacity-building effects in Sierra
Leone); Jane E. Stromseth, PursuingAccountabilityfor AtrocitiesAfter Conflict: What Impact
on Buildingthe Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INTL L. 251,304-08 (2006). See generally STROMSETH
ET AL., supra note 1, at 258-62 (discussing demonstration and capacity-building effects in
general).
149. STROMSETH ET AL., supranote 1, at 297-99.
150. See id. at 295-98.
151. See id. at 61.
152. See id. at 386.
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particular societies," 3 a number of practical challenges have undermined rule of law building in many post-conflict situations. These
include:
5 4
" Insufficient resources, commitment, and patience;
" A lack of unified planning domestically or internationally; 155 and
" Inability or failure to engage local populations effectively
in designing and sustaining reforms. 5 '
Because military interventions of the sort we consider in our book
take place principally in conflict-ridden states whose governmental
institutions are often discredited, devastated, and in enormous need
of assistance, post-conflict reconstruction necessarily takes substantial commitments of time, money, and personnel.'5 7 Half-hearted
efforts to build peace after a conflict will likely fail and may even
render a bad situation worse.' Hence, interveners must strive to
match resources and commitment to the problems at hand.'5 9 In
difficult environments, a major or regional power's support based on
perceived national interest may be critical. Even then, however,
states frequently underestimate the commitment and resources
required and have a hard time sustaining domestic support in their
own societies for the extended effort needed. 6 °
Contributions from many states and organizations are often
required, but the present system of cobbling together resources is
inadequate.' 6 ' Donors have their own particular agendas and
priorities, and their incentives to provide sustained funding are
often limited, resulting in sometimes inadequate and poorly
coordinated assistance programs.'6 2 Also, the explosion in the
153. For example, in Iraq, sectarian violence and insurgency impede efforts to create
security and build the rule of law in much of the country. See id. at 368.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 350-51.
156. See id. at 376-77.
157. See id. at 367.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 368.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 371; see also United Nations Dev. Programme, Governance in Post-conflict
Situations 5-6 (UNDP Background Paper for Working Group Discussions, 2004), availableat
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs04/Cover,%/2OContents/20&%/2OIntroduction.pdf.
162. See STROMSETH AT AL., supranote 1, at 372-73.
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number of actors involved in post-conflict governance and rule of
law promotion has led to duplication of effort, confusion, competition
for resources, gaps in assistance, mixed messages, and lost time,
and has opened the door for spoilers intent on playing different
international actors off against each other.1 6 Efforts to strengthen
coordination mechanisms, monitor pledges and disbursements, and
increase transparency and accountability are crucial."M In recent
years, progress has been made in improving mission planning, and
various planning models now exist.16 5 Less important than the
particular structure chosen is the need to foster a genuine partnership among the multiplicity of organizations and government
agencies involved and to allocate clear responsibility
for achieving
66
agreed objectives in post-conflict reform.
In this process, promoting local ownership of post-conflict reforms
has justifiably become a touchstone.' 6 7 Several key points must be
kept in mind. First, durable social change needs to come from
within; it can be guided but not imposed.6 8 Local leadership and
support is essential to building sustainable institutions and a
culture of respect for democratic governance and rule of law that
will outlast the presence of the interveners.'6 9 Second, the notion of
"local ownership" is complicated. 7 ° Building the rule of law is an
inherently political exercise, with local winners and losers in terms
of opportunities, resources, power, and status.' 7 ' For better or worse,
an intervener's choice of local interlocutors necessarily shifts the
balance of power among competing domestic actors with different
72
visions of their society and different claims to represent it.
Reformers need to appreciate the political complexities and
challenges involved, and must be savvy about who they are
163. Id. at 350-51.
164. See id. at 376.
165. Id. at 355-67, 376. The newly created United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, for
example, despite its limitations, may help to better coordinate funding and planning of postconflict peace building, including rule of law assistance. See id. at 362-64, 376.
166. See id. at 386.
167. See id. at 376; see also Mich~le Flournoy & Michael P6n, Dealing with Demons:Justice
and Reconciliation,WASH. Q., Autumn 2002, at 112.
168. STROMSETH ET AL., supranote 1, at 377.
169. See id. at 378-79.
170. Id. at 377.
171. See id. at 379.
172. Id. at 380.
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supporting and who is likely to have an interest in sabotaging
reform.' 7 3 Third, international and local priorities, standards, and
values will at times conflict, forcing interveners to strike a delicate
balance between respect for local preferences and promotion of
international norms.'7 4 On top of all these dilemmas, deep political,
sectarian, and other conflicts within post-conflict societies can pose
enormous challenges to rule of law building efforts.
This does not mean that building the rule of law is impossible.
But it does mean that it is far more difficult than generally understood. Interveners need to have realistic goals and more humility
about their ability to achieve cultural change.'7 5 They need to be
more aware of the many paradoxes of building the rule of law after
conflict and of the need to move ahead on multiple fronts simultaneously, despite frequent setbacks. They need to understand the
enormous amount of time, resources, and patience that building the
rule of law requires and the political trade-offs and challenges in
particular societies. If reformers understand these complexities,
take them into account up front, and plan accordingly, their efforts
to build the rule of law may have a greater chance of some success.
Although we are not overly optimistic, we are not overly pessimistic, either, and we stress that post-conflict efforts to strengthen the
176
rule of law will continue to be as important as they are difficult.
To maximize chances of success, interveners must:
" Recognize that perceptions of the intervention's legality and
legitimacy will have an impact on the ground;'7 7
" Acknowledge the complexity of the rule of law and be clear
about what it is that they are trying to achieve; 7 '
" Develop basic governance blueprints to determine how to
create appropriate institutions, while recognizing that the
choice of blueprints will inevitably constrain and possibly
undermine some rule of law goals;' 79
" Seize early opportunities to ensure basic security; 80
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 379-84 (discussing the importance and challenges of local ownership).
Id. at 377.
See id. at 81.
Id. at 392.
See id. at 52.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
Id.
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" Reform police, prisons, courts, law schools, and so on, all in
18
tandem; 1
" Ensure that accountability efforts send the right messages
182
and enhance local capacity;
• Avoid undermining rule of law efforts through cultural
insensitivity, poor planning, lack of transparency, or appearance of hypocrisy;8 3
" Think creatively about building rule of law cultures, which
requires going beyond the traditionally 'legal" to consider
informal dispute resolution, community organizing and
advocacy, civil society, education, media, antipoverty and
development initiatives, and ensuring inclusion of nonelites
and marginalized groups;"&
" Plan and coordinate effectively and ensure resources are
8
commensurate to the task. 5
Although it may be impossible to do all of this, strengthening the
rule of law will remain an urgent, compelling task in many postconflict societies. To move ahead constructively, reformers will need
86
to be both more humble and more ambitious at the same time.
They need to be more humble in acknowledging the magnitude of
the task and in recognizing that the role of outsiders is limited.
Reformers must also be more humble in recognizing that durable
cultural change is exceptionally difficult, and that we do not know
as much about how to foster such change as any of us would like.
Yet reformers must also be more ambitious in their willingness to
pursue the rule of law in more creative and holistic ways.
By providing an integrated, thematic study of the many challenges of building the rule of law after intervention, my co-authors
and I hope to encourage those working on these efforts to think
more clearly about the broader endeavor and about how their
particular activities can contribute to a larger whole. For although
each of us may only paint one small piece of the picture, it will
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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Id.
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20081

POST-CONFLICT RULE OF LAW BUILDING

1471

surely be a better work of art if we all understand just what the
picture is supposed to represent in the end, and if we have all given
careful thought to how our own sketches or brushstrokes may fit
into the complex and evolving whole.'8 7

187. Id. at 392.

